*    The original patrols to Muqtada al-Sadr's house and the arrest of his followers were unprovoked, distinctly provocative acts. They occurred just after the Marines replaced Army troops on the scene and are among numerous indicators of a planned new campaign against Sadrist forces.

*    Once the city was surrounded, the helicopter and jet attacks on "suspected positions" of al-Mahdi soldiers would hardly have been needed to rebuff the modestly mounted Sadrist attack on one police station, but fit perfectly with a larger strategy of "softening up" the resistance after preventing it from escaping. So do a number of other American acts, including the commandeering of Najaf's major trauma center (ostensibly for a military staging area), clearly a punitive measure of a kind previously used in Falluja, meant to maximize suffering and expected to hasten surrender.

*    Instead of denying or apologizing for the initial attack on the holy cemetery, the Marine commander on the scene justified it in a public statement. ("The actions of the Moktada militia make the cemetery a legitimate military objective.") The same statement also implied that the Marines would destroy the Holy Shrine if the al-Mahdi occupied it.

*    Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the leading Shia cleric in Iraq, left Najaf just as hostilities erupted. Though he gave what may have been valid medical reasons for his departure for Lebanon and then England, his timing as well as other factors made it appear that he had been informed by the Americans of what was to come and had made a decision to avoid being caught, in every sense, in a major battle for Najaf. (It's possible as well that the Americans, through intermediaries, informed him that they could not guarantee his safety.)

*    Public statements by Iraqi officials of Iyad Allawi's Baghdad government and of American military commanders, as reported in the New York Times, made it clear that their goal was to take control of the entire city away from the Sadrists. The national police commander, for instance, told the press that "the interim government ordered a combined operation ... with the task of regaining control of the city." The governor of the province in which Najaf is situated, Adnan al-Zorfi, told a press briefing: "This operation will never stop before all the militia leave the city." And the Marine commander left no doubt that this conquest would involve the physical occupation of those areas currently controlled by the al-Mahdi army, including the cemetery that had previously been "off limits to the American military for religious reasons." He told Times reporters Sabrina Tavenese and John Burns, "We are fighting them on close terrain but we are on schedule. You have to move very slowly because the cemetery has a lot of mausoleums and little caves [where guerrillas could hide]." (The words "on schedule," by the way, have a particularly ominous ring; they suggest a battle plan for conquering all parts of the city on a street by street basis, a strategy that annihilated whole neighborhoods in Falluja.)

 

    This well-planned attack thus constituted the beginning of a major U.S. offensive almost certainly aimed at making Najaf into the showcase military victory that Falluja was once supposed to be. A rapid and thorough defeat of the insurgents, followed by an uncontested occupation of the entire city, was undoubtedly expected, especially since the lightly armed al-Mahdi soldiers had previously proved a relatively uncoordinated fighting force. Huge and well publicized casualties, as well as heavy physical destruction, were, as in Falluja, undoubtedly part of the formula: since they provide an object example to other cities of the costs of resistance.

    The immediate goals of the ongoing battle were summarized by Alex Berenson and John F. Burns in the New York Times, in response to an offer of a cease fire by the Sadrists:


 

There was little sign a cease-fire would be accepted by the Iraqi
government and American commanders. Instead, the indications
at nightfall were that the American and Iraqi units intended to
press the battle, in the hope of breaking the back of Mr. Sadr's
force in Najaf.
 

    Reporters Tavernese and Burns characterized the more general goals of the offensive in this way:


 

    In effect, the battle appeared to have become a watershed for
the new power alignment in Baghdad, with the new government,
established when Iraq regained formal sovereignty on June 28,
asserting political control, and American troops providing the
irepower to sustain it.
 

    In their attempt to achieve a noteworthy victory, the Bush administration and its Iraqi allies have created a potential watershed for both the war and the American presidential election. To understand why this might be so, consider the following:


 

*    This major offensive was probably motivated by the increasing possibility that the U.S. and its allies were losing all control over most of the major cities in Iraq. In the Sunni parts of the country, city after city has in fact adopted the "Falluja model" - refusing to allow an American presence in its streets and establishing its own local government. As a recent Tomdispatch succinctly summarized the situation: "Think of Sunni Iraq - and possibly parts of Shia Iraq as well - as a 'nation' of city-state fiefdoms, each threatening to blink off [the U.S.] map of 'sovereignty,' despite our 140,000 troops and our huge bases in the country." The attack in Najaf is certainly an attempt to stem this tide before it engulfs the Shia areas of Iraq as well, and it validates historian Juan Cole's ironic description of Prime Minister Allawi as "really... just the mayor of downtown Baghdad."
    
*    The U.S. and its Iraqi clients probably chose Najaf because it represented their best chance of immediate success. Unlike the mujaheddin in Falluja (and other Sunni cities), the al-Mahdi soldiers were generally not members of Saddam's army and are therefore more lightly armed and considerably less undisciplined as fighters; nor do they enjoy the unconditional support of the local population. (For an indelible portrait of civilian attitudes in Najaf, see Scott Baldauf's first-hand account of the fighting in Najaf in the Christian Science Monitor.) An ambivalent city is easier to conquer, even if victory results in a sullen hatred of the conquerors. A quick victory would therefore be a noteworthy achievement and might have some chance of convincing rebels in other Shia cities not to follow the Falluja model - at least not immediately.
 

    However, a loss in Najaf (which could occur even with a military "victory") would be catastrophic for the U.S. and for its interim administration in Baghdad, which is now indelibly identified with the Najaf offensive (and has ostensibly "ordered" it). Even a victory would, at least in the long run, undermine the already strained tolerance of the country's deeply suspicious Shia population. The Americans inside the Green Zone in Baghdad (and assumedly in Washington) are, however, banking on the possibility that an immediate victory might be worth the negative publicity. It might establish the interim administration (and its American muscle) as a formidable, if brutal, adversary, worthy of fear if not respect. A defeat, on the other hand, would make it nothing more than an impotent adjunct of the American occupation.

    For the Bush administration, the battle of Najaf shapes up as a new Falluja: If it doesn't win quickly, it will likely be a major disaster. A quick victory might indeed make it look, for a time, as if the occupation, now in new clothes, had turned some corner, particularly if it resulted in temporary quiescence throughout the Shia south. But a long and brutal fight, or even an inconclusive victory (which led to further fighting elsewhere in Shia Iraq or renewed low-level fighting in Najaf) would almost certainly trigger yet more problems not just in Iraq but throughout the Middle East. And this would lead in turn to another round of worldwide outrage, and so to yet another electoral problem at home.

    A loss after a long bloody battle would yield all of the above, while reducing the American military to the use of air power against cities, without any real hope of pacifying them.

    Our presidential election could be decided by this battle. President Bush's approval ratings dropped 10% during the April and May battles, creating the opening for a Kerry victory. Since then they have neither recovered, nor deteriorated further. If the battle for Najaf dominates the headlines for as long as a week, it will likely be the next big event in the Presidential campaign. A resounding victory for American forces could be exactly what Karl Rove has been dreaming of - proof that the tide has turned in Iraq. At the very least, it might remove the subject from the front pages of American papers and drop it down the nightly network prime-time news for a suitable period of time. But a defeat as ignominious as Falluja - or even a bloody and destructive victory bought at the expense of worldwide outrage - would almost certainly drive away many remaining swing voters (and might weaken the resolve of small numbers of Republican voters as well). This would leave Bush where his father was going into the electoral stretch drive - in too deep a deficit for any campaign rhetoric to overcome.

    One has to wonder why the Bush Administration has selected such a risky strategy, fraught with possibly disastrous consequences. The only explanation that makes sense is that they are desperate. In Iraq, their control is slipping away one city at a time, a process that actually accelerated after the "transfer of sovereignty." A dramatic military offensive may be the only way they can imagine - especially since their thinking is so militarily oriented - to reverse this decline.

    In the United States, their electoral position is not promising: their hope for a dramatic economic turnaround has been dashed; a post-sovereignty month of quiescence in our media about Iraq did not reduce opposition to the war; and recently there has been a further erosion of confidence in Bush's anti-terrorist policies. No incumbent president (the Truman miracle of 1948 excepted) has won re-election with a less-than-50% positive job rating. (The President's now stands somewhere around 47%.) A dramatic military victory, embellished with all sorts of positive spin, might reverse what has begun to look like irretrievable erosion in his re-election chances. The Bush administration appears to have decided that it must take a huge risk to generate a military victory that can turn the tide in both Iraq and in the United States.

    The agony of the current American offensive begins with the death and destruction it is wreaking on an ancient and holy city. Beyond that, the primary damage, may lie in the less visible horror that animates this new military strategy. The U.S. is no longer capable either of winning the "battle for the hearts and minds" of the Iraqis or governing most of the country. But by crushing the city of Najaf, the Marines might be able quiet the rebellion for long enough to spin the November election back to Bush.

    For details on the battle of Najaf, see the excellent daily summaries of Juan Cole on Informed Comment.


    Michael Schwartz, professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook has written extensively on popular protest and insurgency, and on American business and government dynamics. His work on Iraq has appeared at ZNET  and TomDispatch, and in Z magazine. His books include Radical Politics and Social Structure, The Power Structure of American Business (with Beth Mintz), and Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda (edited, with Clarence Lo).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

Los Angeles Times
 

http://www.latimes.com/news/yahoo/la-fg-mosque12aug12,1,2750241.story

12 August 2004


World's Shiites Warn That U.S.is Treading on Sensitive Ground
        By Henry Chu and Teresa Watanabe

    Baghdad - With its twin minarets and glinting gold dome, the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf has been a beacon for the Muslim faithful for more than a thousand years. But with fighting raging around the Iraqi shrine, one of the holiest sites in Shiite Islam is reprising a different historical role: rallying point against foreign forces.

    In 1920, rebels intent on kicking out British troops occupying the region gathered at the mosque and readied for revolt. Among their leaders was Sayyid Mohammed Sadr - the scion of a prominent Shiite family and a future prime minister.

    Eighty-four years later, cleric Muqtada Sadr, one of Sadr's descendants, wants the U.S. military out. All eyes are once again trained on the shrine, where a final showdown between Muqtada Sadr's militia and American troops may yet take place.

    "Keep fighting even if you see me detained or martyred," Sadr said Wednesday to his armed followers, many of whom are holed up in the shrine. "I thank the dear fighters all over Iraq for what they have done to set back injustice."

    With U.S. military officials saying they have received permission from Najaf's governor to strike the mosque if necessary, religious and political leaders from Iran to Los Angeles are voicing grave warnings that an American assault on the shrine could be catastrophic to the U.S. image in Iraq and the Muslim world.

    "The United States is slaughtering the people of one of the holiest Islamic cities, and the Muslim world and the Iraqi nation will not stand by," Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of neighboring Iran, said in an address on Iranian state television.

    Three major American Muslim organizations also issued statements Wednesday calling for negotiations to end the conflict.

    "Illegal under the Geneva Conventions, any fighting or destruction to the mosque would result in incalculable damage to the image and interests of the United States and would be widely condemned across the world," the Los Angeles-based Muslim Public Affairs Council said.

    U.S. authorities, while repeatedly declaring that Sadr has made the mosque a legitimate military target, also have pledged to proceed with caution. "We have always respected that as a holy site," one senior U.S. military official said this week, on condition his name not be used.

    Believed to have been erected in the 8th century and rebuilt at various times, the Imam Ali shrine is the heart of Najaf, each year attracting hundreds of thousands of pilgrims. The mosque sits in Najaf's Old City amid a dusty, raucous maze of shops and alleys.

    Shiites revere the shrine as the burial place of Imam Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad, and in their eyes, his legitimate successor. Ali, who was assassinated in 661 in the nearby town of Kufa, was said to have been buried in secret so his enemies could not desecrate his tomb, but the spot was discovered decades later and a shrine was built over it.

    Religious tourism has been Najaf's lifeblood for centuries, and the mosque is a repository of riches: Precious gifts from sultans and potentates are housed there, and offering boxes are stuffed with currency from all over the world.

    Abutting the mosque is a cemetery known as the Valley of Peace. One of the world's biggest graveyards, it is a treeless expanse dotted with gravestones and mausoleums containing the remains of millions who wanted to be interred close to Ali.

    Though some Muslims are critical of Sadr for courting a military attack on the shrine, others say they are disturbed by news reports showing U.S. soldiers stepping on graves and destroying the photos of loved ones laid on top of the crypts.

    Shiites "worldwide are shocked and outraged over what is going on in Najaf," said Imam Moustafa Al-Qazwini, a prominent Shiite leader in Southern California. "They consider it an assault on the sanctity of Islam and in particular Shia Islam. Any attack on that city will destroy America's future in Iraq completely. It will completely discredit America and make it the new tyrant in the eyes of Shias worldwide."

    Several Shiite Muslims likened any attack on the mosque to bombing the Vatican, and predicted that it would spark retaliatory attacks on U.S. facilities in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Lebanon and other nations with significant Shiite populations. Parvez Shah of the Universal Muslim Assn. of America called for Iraqi forces to replace U.S. troops in Najaf to defuse growing tensions.

    Although the governor of Najaf, Adnan Zurfi, reportedly gave U.S. troops permission to fire on the mosque if necessary, Al-Qazwini said that few Shiites regard his word as authoritative. They say he was chosen for the post by U.S. officials, not elected, only recently returning to Iraq after a decade in the Detroit area.

    Early today, the Iraqi government issued a statement on behalf of interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi assuring Iraqis "that the holy shrine will remain safe from all attacks that could possibly harm its sacredness." Allawi "is holding the armed elements inside the shrine responsible for any harm or damage that may occur."

    In the eyes of most Shiites, Al-Qazwini said, only a leader with the standing of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani could issue permission to attack at the mosque. Sistani, who is based in Najaf, is in London, reportedly for medical treatment.

    Over the last century, the mosque and nearby cemetery have been marred by numerous incidents of violence.

    In the 1920s, the shrine was a center of unrest during the revolt against British rule, used by Sayyid Mohammed Sadr, the leader of a secret Shiite society, to rally thousands of fighters.

    The insurrection failed, ending with heavy losses on both sides. After the fighting, Winston Churchill, then Britain's colonial secretary, said he was astonished at how the British had "succeeded in such a short time in alienating the whole country."

    In the 1980s, men who wanted to avoid service in the Iran-Iraq war hid in some of the graveyard's underground crypts. After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, President Saddam Hussein had part of the cemetery bulldozed following a failed Shiite uprising.

    The bloodshed continued last year. In April, a young cleric was stabbed to death near the mosque's entrance - a slaying in which Muqtada Sadr is implicated, Iraqi officials say. Four months later, a car bomb killed nearly 100 people.

    And this spring, there was widespread anger when outer parts of the shrine were damaged, apparently by mortar fire, in fighting between U.S. troops and Sadr's forces. The U.S. denied that it was responsible and suggested that Al Mahdi militiamen may have inflicted the damage to provoke outrage.

    Now U.S. officials say Sadr's fighters are using the graveyard as a weapons storehouse. The fierce combat of the last week, some of it hand-to-hand, broke hundreds of tombstones in half. U.S. military officials said militants had punched openings in crypts to use as sniper holes and stashed weapons in coffins.

    Although the cemetery is considered less sacred than the mosque, many Shiites are dismayed by the militarization of the final resting place.

    "Imagine turning this Valley of Peace into a valley of destruction," Al-Qazwini said. "People are offended. They believe anyone taken to that cemetery will enjoy peace and tranquillity. They can't stand seeing Apaches and other military aircraft bombing the area and disturbing the graves.

    "It's very outrageous and sad."
-----------------------------------------------
 

Reuters
 

http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=5940358

12 August 2004

Milestone of 1,000th U.S. Death in Iraq Looms for Bush
    By Alan Elsner

    Washington - The United States faces a painful moment probably next month when its military deaths in Iraq are expected to surpass 1,000. It will also be a crucial moment for President Bush, who faces a presidential campaign in which Iraq is a central issue.

    "Unfortunately that day will likely arrive next month and it will be a fulcrum event that may change many people's views of what we're doing in Iraq," said David Birdsell, a political scientist at Baruch College in New York City.

    "It's a gripping number, a large number, a tragic number and it will be a pivot to revisit Bush's reasons for fighting the war and his premature declaration last year that the mission had been accomplished," he said.

    According to the most up-to-date Pentagon figure, which usually lags events on the ground by a few days, the United States has lost 931 military personnel in Iraq since the war began in March 2003.

    In July, the first month after an Iraqi interim authority took office, U.S. deaths totaled 55, compared to 42 the previous month. So far this month, they are running at a similar or possibly slightly higher rate.

    Compared to past wars, this is a relatively low figure. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. lost 1,363 soldiers in the month of March 1968 alone and more than 58,000 for the entire war. But it is still a higher rate than for any military conflict the United States has fought since Vietnam.

    "The Iraqi body count hurts the president. Already less than half of respondents in my polling say the war was worth fighting and the 1,000 casualty will be a milestone that will be page one news and put a lot more focus on it," said pollster John Zogby.

    Republican political adviser Keith Appell agreed that the 1,000th death would be an "awful milestone" but argued that it would not change anything in the presidential campaign.

    "The Republicans will be on defense for a couple of days but I don't expect the Bush campaign to back off anything it is saying. He needs to stand resolute, to promise to stay the course until victory and to argue that we have no choice but to fight this war," he said.

    
Kerry May Keep Quiet
    
  Conversely, Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry's best strategy may be to confine himself to expressions of sorrow and comfort for the families of the fallen.

    "Kerry may just keep quiet. The media will probably do the job for him," said University of Michigan political scientist Vincent Hutchings.

    The moment will likely arrive around the time when the candidates are preparing for their crucial debates, tentatively scheduled for late September and early October.

    From the perspective of Bush's campaign, University of Georgia political scientist Brad Lockerbie said, better the number is reached in September than in October.

    After the handover of power to the Iraqi interim government, Iraq seemed to fade from the front pages of the U.S. media, although the death toll continued to rise.

    Now, with U.S. forces engaged in a bloody battle against radical Shi'ite cleric Moktada al-Sadr in the holy city of Najaf in which more than Iraqi 360 militiamen and five U.S. servicemen have been killed, it is back in the headlines.

    Polls indicate that the domestic economy and Iraq are the two top issues in the Nov. 2 election and Bush seems vulnerable on both. But Lockerbie said opinions on Iraq had largely crystallized.

    "This will be a big deal for a short period of time but those who have decided Bush made the right decision in going to war won't change their minds," he said.
------------------------------------------

News That Stays News - 260


 

What Have Your Brought
 Home From the Wars?


What have you brought
home from the wars, father?
Scars.
We fought far overseas; we knew
the victory must
be at home.
But here I see
only a trial by time
of those
who know.
The public men all shout :  Come bomb,
come burn
our hate.
I do not want it shot;
I want it solved.
This is the word
the dead men said.
They said peace.
I saw in the hot light
of our century
each face killed.

 

   --Muriel Rukeyser
      The Speed of Darkness